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Abstract
This paper documents and explains the existence of grade non-disclosure policies
in Masters in Business Administration programs, why these policies are concentrated
in highly-ranked programs, and why these policies are not prevalent in most other
professional degree programs. Related policies, including honors and minimum grade
requirements, are also consistent with our model.
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1 Introduction
The signal value of education has been well studied ever since Michael Spence’s seminal 1973
contribution. It is, therefore, interesting that students in many leading Master of Business
Administration (MBA) programs vote to reduce the accuracy of their own signal by passing
grade non-disclosure policies. These policies are distinctive in that they mainly exist in MBA
programs and not in other professional programs including medicine, law, and accounting.1
Moreover, grade non-disclosure is most prevalent in schools where the faculty are largely
trained economists. In some cases, faculty seems to support these policies – or, at least, not
heavily discourage them.2
The Wharton School, 3620 Locust Walk, SH-DH 3303, Philadelphia, PA. Daniel Gottlieb:
dgott@wharton.upenn.edu. Kent Smetters: Smetters@wharton.upenn.edu.
1Some medical and under-graduate programs (e.g., MIT) have limited grade non-disclosure, for example,
covering ﬁrst-year grades. Yale Law has only limited disclosure as well. But these cases are exceptional and
typically don’t limit the signal as much as many MBA programs.
2As deputy dean of Stanford’s Graduate School of Business, David Kreps wrote a thoughtful memorandum
in 2005 that discussed the advantages and disadvantages of grade non-disclosure during a period of school
debate. He expressed his personal support for non-disclosure, with some caveats. But he explained that the
school’s oﬃcial policy under the law is to remain neutral, thereby making non-disclosure a norm of students
rather than a policy of the school. Michael Spence was Stanford’s dean during this period. At Harvard
Business School, grade non-disclosure was considered an oﬃcial school policy. Students were required by
the administration to accept grade non-disclosure before matriculation, and those who did not follow these
1By U.S. federal law, academic grades cannot be released by schools to third-parties,
including potential employers, without student permission.3 The law allows for “directory”
information to be disclosed, including characteristics such as name, address, ﬁeld of study,
date of attendance, and degrees as well as “awards” and other “honors.” The exact level of
granularity for awards and honors is not deﬁned precisely by law. But the conventional legal
wisdom is that information pertaining to awards and honors should be limited to exceptional
performance. An award or honor system whose main purpose is to substitute for traditional
grading marks (e.g., “Platinum,” “Gold,” “Silver,” and “Bronze” instead of “A,” “B,” “C,” and
“D/F”), would not be considered to be “directory” information.
Since grades are the property of students and not schools, students can vote to create
a “social norm” of grade non-disclosure to potential employers. While individual students
are legally allowed to break ranks with this norm and disclose their individual grades, they
generally do not. Moreover, employers (often including alumni) typically do not ask for grade
information at schools where non-disclosure has been endorsed by students.
As shown in Tables I and II, grade non-disclosure policies in MBA programs are concen-
trated within highly-ranked schools. A majority of the most selective 15 schools have a grade
non-disclosure policy, while no school ranked 20 - 50 has such a policy. In some cases, school
faculty do not appear to openly oppose the non-disclosure policy approved by students. In
other cases, like at Wharton, the faculty is fairly vocal in their opposition to the policy, which
is generally approved each year by a large majority (about 95%) of students. Students at
Wharton and many other top-tier programs argue that non-disclosure allows them to take
greater risks and harder courses without fear of having an embarrassing transcript. In prac-
tice, self-reported levels of learning eﬀort have fallen signiﬁcantly since the introduction of
grade non-disclosure (Jain 2005).
However, business schools with a grade non-disclosure norm typically have some method
of revealing the very best students. This revelation usually takes the form of awards and
honors. Moreover, at Chicago’s Booth School of Business, where grade non-disclosure is the
norm, MBA students also openly compete to earn teaching assistant positions, which are
viewed as an indicator of excellent performance.4 Concurrently, at many schools, including
Wharton, students whose grades fall below some minimum standards are also dismissed.
This paper sets out to explain the main stylized facts about non-disclosure policies. First,
what are conditions that lead to majority support of non-disclosure policies among students?
Second, why is support for non-disclosure mainly concentrated within highly selective pro-
grams? Third, why isn’t non-disclosure prevalent within other professional degree granting
programs such as medicine, law, and accounting? Fourth, how does the introduction of
awards and minimum grade requirements, which reintroduce some informativeness, impact
the support for nondisclosure and welfare?
policies were subject to disciplinary action (Ciolli, 2007). There was concern about the legality of these
requirements, which led the school to eventually remove them by 2005 [The Economist, “News from the
schools.” (Dec 16, 2005)]. At INSEAD, grade non-disclosure is still an oﬃcial school policy and students and
recruiters found in breach of it are subject to disciplinary action. [INSEAD MBA Career Services, “Grade
Non Disclosure Policy,” insidemba.insead.edu/careers/whatsnew/GradeNonDisclosure.pdf.
3The Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) (20 U.S.C. § 1232g; 34 CFR Part 99), some-
times called the Buckley Amendment, is a Federal law that protects the privacy of student education records.
4Devin Pope (private communication).
2We construct a model with students, schools, and employers. Students prefer larger post-
school wages but dislike studying. Schools are heterogenous in their selectivity (reputation).
Under disclosure, employers can observe both a student’s grades and the school’s selectiv-
ity; under non-disclosure, an employer can only observe the partial signal of the school’s
selectivity.
Section 2 then derives the conditions that support grade non-disclosure under a non-
overlapping property of the relationship between eﬀort and grades. This assumption allows
for the most straightforward interpretation of our results. We show that students at elite
schools are the most likely to adopt a non-disclosure policy, subsequently reducing their eﬀort.
Intuitively, a non-disclosure policy allows the median voter to study less and then pool to
receive the expected (mean) wage, which might be more valuable to her than receiving the
median wage with eﬀort. For plausible wage distributions, the desire to pool becomes more
valuable at more selective schools. Section 3 then generalizes the results to the case where
the non-overlapping property is relaxed. Section 4 explains why grade non-disclosure is not
common in other professional degree programs, including medicine, law and accounting. In
particular, minimum certiﬁcation requirements undercut the support for grade non-disclosure
in those programs by requiring a level of eﬀort that is complementary to studying, thereby
reducing the value from pooling to reduce eﬀort. Section 5 extends the analysis to allow
for awards (similarly, honors) as well as minimum grades. Interestingly, while a minimum
grade requirement encourages additional eﬀort from lower ability students, the requirement
also reinforces the support for non-disclosure by raising the expected pooled wage with low
eﬀort without changing the median wage with high eﬀort. In contrast, awards reduce the
support for non-disclosure by allowing higher-ability students to separate, thereby reducing
the expected wage earned by the pool of students who have not obtained this additional
signal. Section 6 then draws some conclusions, including a discussion of some mechanisms




Consider a model of students, schools, and employers. Students have ability types  dis-
tributed in a (possibly unbounded) closed interval [0;1] with 0  0 < 1  +1: Eﬀort
at school is binary e 2 f0;1g:5 Schools are characterized by a selectivity parameter  2 R;
which aﬀects the distribution of accepted students.6 A school with selectivity  accepts a
continuum of students distributed according to an atomless cumulative distribution function
. We assume that more selective schools pick a better distribution of students. Formally,
 > 0 implies that  ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates (FOSD) 0: Let E denote the
expectation operator with respect to the distribution  and let Median
 denote the median
type under distribution :
5In the Appendix, we show that our results generalize to the case of a continuum of eﬀort levels.
6To determine admission, schools can observe some pre-school signal of performance (e.g., undergraduate
transcript, GMAT, etc.) to determine if it exceeds the school’s .
3Each student has a utility function
U(w;e) = w   c(e);
where w is the student’s wage and e is the studying eﬀort. The costs of eﬀort are c(1) := c > 0;
c(0) = 0:7
We make the following assumptions about the grade technology:
Assumption 1 (Non-overlapping grades). g is continuous, strictly increasing, and sat-
isﬁes g(0;1)  g(1;0).
Continuity of g is a technical assumption. The assumption that g is increasing states that
individuals with greater ability and higher eﬀort get higher grades. The third assumption
states that even the highest skilled student gets a lower grade than the lowest ability student
if the highest type doesn’t study (i.e., the sets of grades under high and low eﬀorts do not
overlap). This assumption, which will be dropped in Section 3, simpliﬁes the analysis of the
equilibrium with disclosure.
Upon graduation, students obtain jobs in a competitive market of employers. A student
with ability  who exerts studying eﬀort e has productivity f(;e) =  + e; where   0
parametrizes the human capital component of education.8 When  = 0, studying eﬀort does
not aﬀect productivity and grades have purely a signaling aspect. When  > 0; education
also has a human capital dimension and studying increases the student’s productivity.
As discussed in the introduction, students determine the school’s disclosure policy through
a voting procedure. We formalize this mechanism by assuming that the voting procedure
selects the policy preferred by the majority of students.9
The timing of the game is as follows:
t=1. Voting: A pool of students with types  distributed according to  joins the school.
The disclosure policy d 2 fD;NDg is determined by majority voting, where D denotes
a policy of disclosing grades and ND denotes not disclosing grades.
t=2. Eﬀort: Each student chooses a level of eﬀort e 2 f0;1g and obtains a grade g (;e).
t=3. Market Wage: A competitive market of employers observes the school’s selectivity
, the school policy’s policy on grade non-disclosure, and, if allowed, grades. The
competitive market oﬀers a wage w equal to the expected productivity of the student.
7The minimum eﬀort level denotes the amount a student would choose in the absence of explicit incentives.
While we have normalized it to zero, we do not claim that students would not study at all in the absence of
explicit incentives.
8In the Appendix, we characterize the solution of our model for general production functions f(;e):
9When there are ﬁnitely many students, this procedure picks the unique equilibrium outcome from the
strategic voting game. With inﬁnitely many students, each student has mass zero and, therefore, is indiﬀerent
between voting in either policy. As a result, all policies can be an equilibrium of the the voting game. The
procedure then picks the equilibrium in which students vote on their preferred strategies. This is the only
outcome that can be approached taking the limit of the game with ﬁnitely many players as the number of
players grows.
42.2 Equilibrium
We study the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the game.
Deﬁnition 1. A Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the game is a proﬁle of strategies
feD ();eND ();wD (G);wNDg; a disclosure policy d 2 fD;NDg, and beliefs fD ( j G);ND ()g
such that
1. Each student’s strategy is optimal given the wage schedule and the disclosure policy:
eD () 2 argmax
~ e
wD (g (;e))   c(e);
eND () 2 argmax
~ e
wND   c(e):









3. The disclosure policy satisﬁes a majority rule:


1(UD () > UND ())d >
1
2
=) d = D; and


1(UND () > UD ())d >
1
2
=) d = ND;
where 1 denotes the indicator function and Ud () denotes the payoﬀ of type  under
disclosure policy d:10
4. Beliefs are consistent:
(a) ND () is derived from the student’s strategy using Bayes’ rule,
(b) D ( j G) is derived from the student’s strategy using Bayes’ rule whenever G =
g(;eD()) for some ; and
(c) D ( j G) assigns mass zero to all types for which g(;0) 6= G and g(;1) 6= G.
Conditions (1) and (2) are the standard perfection requirements, stating that players choose
their actions optimally given beliefs and other players’ actions. Condition (3) is the majority
rule requirement for the disclosure policy. Conditions (4a) and (4b) require beliefs on the
equilibrium path of the continuation games after the disclosure policy is determined to satisfy
Bayes’ rule.11 Condition (4c) states that beliefs conditional on a grade cannot attach a
positive mass to types for whom this grade is unattainable.
We study the equilibrium of the game backwards.
10Formally, UND ()  wND   c(eND ()) and UD ()  wD (g(;eD ())   c(eD ()):
11This game has two proper subgames, each starting after a disclosure policy is determined. Consistency of
beliefs for the continuation games after the disclosure policies are determined, therefore, amounts to imposing
subgame perfection.
5t=3. Market Wages: Conditions (2) and (4) require that, in the case of non-disclosure,
employers oﬀer wages equal to the student’s expected productivity:
wND = E [ + eND()]: (1)
In the case of disclosure, the market wage is equal to the student’s expected productivity
for all grades on the equilibrium path:
wD (G) = E [ + eD()jg (;eD ()) = G];
whenever G = g (;eD ()) for some :
Because g is strictly increasing in  and g(0;1)  g(1;0); each grade uniquely identiﬁes
the student’s skills. Condition (4c) implies that the market must assign probability 1
to type  when an oﬀ-equilibrium-path grade is only achievable by type : Therefore,
the wage schedule is determined by
wD(g(;e)) =  + e; (2)
for e 2 f0;1g and  2 [0;1]:
t=2. Eﬀort: Under no disclosure, students are oﬀered the same wage regardless of their
grades. Then, because eﬀort is costly and does not aﬀect wages, condition (1) implies
that all types choose zero eﬀort: eND() = 0:
Under disclosure, a type- student who exerts eﬀort e gets utility  +e c: Thus, the
high eﬀort is chosen if   c and the low eﬀort is chosen in   c: The student’s utility
under disclosure is
 + maxf   c;0g:
t=1. Voting: Consider the students’ preferences over disclosure and non-disclosure. Type 
prefers disclosure if
 + maxf   c;0g  E []: (3)
The student’s voting decision balances her own disclosed productivity under disclosure
(the left-hand side of equation (3)) against the expected pooled wage with low eﬀort
that she would receive under non-disclosure (the right-hand side of equation (3)). Of
course, that decision depends on whether, under disclosure, it is eﬃcient for the student
to actually study (  c), thereby earning  + (   c) rather than just .
2.3 Majority Rule and the Role of Selectivity
Turning now to the majority outcome, the decision made by the median voter, for a given level
of school selectivity , must, therefore, balance the median wage under disclosure (Median
 +
maxf   c;0g) against the pooled mean wage with low eﬀort under non-disclosure (E []).
A vote for disclosure allows the median voter to reveal his or her actual productivity; the
median voter will then choose high eﬀort if it is eﬃcient to do so (  c). A vote for
non-disclosure, however, allows the median voter to essentially “free ride” oﬀ of the expected
pooled wage, which will be advantageous when there are enough students who are more
productive than the median voter.
6Proposition 1. In any PBE, disclosure is chosen if Median
 + maxf   c;0g  E [] and
non-disclosure is chosen if Median
 + maxf   c;0g  E [].
The disclosure policy, therefore, depends on the skewness of the distribution of ability.
When the distribution of ability is symmetric, the median is equal to the mean. Then, there
always exists an equilibrium with grade disclosure. Moreover, when high eﬀort is eﬃcient
 > c; no equilibrium features grade non-disclosure.
However, actual wage distributions exhibit the empirical property that the median wage
is below the mean (consistent with example distributions considered below). It is, therefore,
reasonable to assume that the median ability is lower than mean ability: Median
 < E[].
Therefore, as long as the human capital parameter  is “not too large,” non-disclosure is
chosen.
Corollary 1. Suppose Median
 < E[]. There exists   > c such that, in any PBE, non-
disclosure is chosen if     and disclosure is chosen if    :
Greater school selectivity , however, has an ambiguous impact on the support for non-
disclosure. A larger value of  increases both median and mean abilities. If the mean ability
is more responsive to a change in selectivity than the median, increasing selectivity would
raise the proportion of people voting for non-disclosure. Then, the most selective schools
would be the ones whose students vote to implement a grade non-disclosure policy. Formally,
let G()  E[]   Median
 denote the mean-median gap. We, therefore, have:
Corollary 2. Suppose G() is increasing. There exists   2 R[f 1;+1g such that, in
any PBE, non-disclosure is chosen if  >   and disclosure is chosen in  <  :
Thus, more selective schools will adopt grade non-disclosure policies while less selective
schools will not if the mean-median gap is increasing in school selectivity. The increasing
mean-median gap assumption states that higher selectivity increases the quality of students
by attracting a disproportionately higher amount of very good students. As we show in
Examples 1 and 2, the conditions of Corollaries 1 and 2 are satisﬁed by the most commonly
used wage distributions: those belonging to lognormal and the truncated normal families.
Example 1. Suppose   lognormal(;2). Then, the mean E[] = e+ 2
2 is always greater
than the median Median






is increasing in : Hence,
the conditions of Corollaries 1 and 2 are satisﬁed. In fact, the equilibrium disclosure policy
can be calculated analytically. Grade non-disclosure is selected if
 
(






if  > c
 1 if   c
:
Example 2. Suppose  is distributed according to a truncated normal with parameters















; where  and  are the probability and cumulative distribution func-
tions of the standard normal distribution. This distribution displays a positive mean-median
7gap for all truncation parameters  located within approximately 8 standard deviations from
the mean . For realistic parameters , wages 8 standard deviations below the mean would
give negative wages, and therefore, are unreasonable.
The mean-median gap is increasing in selectivity in the truncated normal case except
when the truncation occurs in the middle of the right tail. Such high values for the truncation
parameter, though, would produce an unusual shape for the wage distribution, with the mode
being equal to the lowest value in the support and with most of the mass being concentrated
very close to the truncation. Since typical wage distributions seem to have an interior mode,
we ﬁnd it reasonable to assume that  < , which implies that the gap is always increasing
in selectivity.12 Thus, for realistic truncation parameters, the conditions from Corollaries 1
and 2 are satisﬁed.
Therefore, under typical wage distributions, our model predicts that selective schools
would adopt a grade non-disclosure policy whereas less selective schools would adopt a policy
of disclosure. This pattern is consistent with the evidence from MBA programs (Tables I and
II). Our model also predicts that studying eﬀort is (weakly) lower with grade non-disclosure,
which is also consistent with the evidence reported in Jain (2005).
3 Overlapping Grades
Thus far, we have assumed that education had such a strong eﬀect on grades that the lowest
ability student obtained a higher grade by studying than the highest ability student who did
not study (non-overlapping grades). This assumption simpliﬁed the analysis because each
grade fully identiﬁes the student’s skill. In practice, however, the highest ability student may
be able to obtain relatively better grades even without exerting much eﬀort. This section,
therefore, allows grades to overlap. For simplicity, we focus on an additive grade technology:13
g (;e) =  + e:
Assumption 2 (Overlapping Grades). 1 > 0 +  where  > 0:
Under Assumption 2, which replaces Assumption 1, the set of possible grades under high
and low eﬀorts are now allowed to overlap. A high eﬀort allows a type- student, at a cost
of c, to obtain the same grade of a type  +  who chooses low eﬀort.
It is helpful to partition the grade space into three intervals:
1. In the lowest interval, [0;0+); each grade G can only be obtained by the type  = G
under low eﬀort. Consistency (Condition 4(c)) requires beliefs D(jG) to assign a unit
mass at type G:
2. In the intermediate interval, [0 +;1]; grades can be obtained by two diﬀerent types:
 = G under low eﬀort and  = G    under high eﬀort. Consistency requires beliefs
to assign zero mass to all other types.
12More precisely, the mean-median gap is positive if  2 [   8:437; + 7:7073] and it is increasing if
  0:210:
13The Appendix presents results for general grade technologies.
83. In the highest interval, (1;1 + ]; each grade G can only be obtained by the type
 = G  under high eﬀort. Consistency requires beliefs to assign a unit mass to type
G   :
The ﬁrst two intervals are always non-empty whereas the third interval is empty when 1 =
+1. In this section, we will also assume that it is eﬃcient to exert high eﬀort:  > c:
Deﬁnition 2. We will say that grades are suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort if  > c; and we
will say that they are not suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort if  < c:
In words, grades are suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort if exerting high eﬀort allows a student
to pool with someone whose productivity exceeds the student’s own productivity by an
amount greater than the cost: ( + )    > c.
3.1 Equilibrium with responsive grades
We ﬁrst characterize the unique equilibrium of the continuation game after grade disclosure
has been selected in the case of suﬃciently responsive grades. Since this unique equilibrium
involves full separation of types, the results from Section 2 remain unchanged in any PBE of
the game.
Proposition 2. Suppose grades are suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort. There exists a unique
PBE of the continuation game conditional on grade disclosure in which eD() = 1 for all :
Furthermore, this PBE survives the intuitive criterion.14
The proof of Proposition 2 will be presented through a series of lemmata. Intuitively,
deviating from a high to a low eﬀort causes the student to be pooled with someone with much
lower productivity, and so this cannot be a proﬁtable deviation when grades are suﬃciently
responsive to eﬀort. Similarly, deviating in eﬀort from low to high causes the student to be
pooled with someone with higher productivity, which is a proﬁtable deviation under suﬃcient
responsiveness, ruling out low eﬀort as an equilibrium. Therefore, only equilibria in which
everyone studies hard can be sustained.
Lemma 1. Suppose grades are suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort. There exists a PBE that
survives the intuitive criterion in which eD() = 1 for all :
Proof. Let eD() = 1 for all types and consider a deviation by a type  to e = 0: Since this
is a separating equilibrium, each type gets payoﬀ u() =  +    c: If  < 0 + , deviating
fully identiﬁes the type and the market oﬀers wage w = : The deviation is not proﬁtable
since  > c =)  +    c > : If a type belongs to either the second or the third interval,
deviating leads to grade ; which is the equilibrium grade of type    ; who exerts high
eﬀort. Therefore, the market oﬀers wage w =    +. This deviation is also not proﬁtable
since  > c =)  +    c >  +    . Hence, eD() = 1 is an equilibrium.
But it remains to be shown that it survives the intuitive criterion. The set of oﬀ-
equilibrium-path grades is [0;0 + ): Any grade G in this interval can only be obtained
by type  = G. Let v(G;w;) denote the payoﬀ of type  when she obtains grade G (or, in
14See Cho and Kreps (1987) for a presentation of the intuitive criterion.
9the standard signaling terms, sends message G) and the market oﬀers wage w: Message G is
dominated by the equilibrium payoﬀs since
u
(G) = G +    c > v(G;G;G):
Thus, the equilibrium trivially satisﬁed the intuitive criterion.
Lemma 2. Suppose grades are suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort. There is no PBE in which
eD() 6= 1 for some :
Proof. Suppose, by contradiction, we have a PBE in which eD() = 0 for some type . Now
consider a deviation to e = 1: There are 3 possibilities: she separates herself, she obtains a
grade already being taken by type  + , or she obtains a grade that is oﬀ-the-equilibrium
path. If she separates herself, she obtains payoﬀ  +    c >  = u(): Thus, the deviation
is proﬁtable. If she takes the grade already taken by type  + ; she obtains  +    c > ;
which is also a proﬁtable deviation. Finally, if the student obtains an oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path
grade, she obtains
( + ) + (1   )( + )   c = ( +    c) + (1   )( +    c);
where  2 [0;1] are the market’s beliefs about the probability of the deviant type being :
Since + c >  and + c > ; it follows that this term is greater than the equilibrium
payoﬀ u () =  for any belief : Therefore, we cannot have a PBE in which e() = 0:
From Condition 4 of Deﬁnition 1, beliefs (jG) must assign a unit mass at  = G   
for all G  0 +  and a unit mass at  = G for all G < 0 + : Furthermore, in any PBE,
the market must oﬀer the following wage schedule:
w(G) =

G    +  if G  0 + 
G if G < 0 +  :
Thus, Lemmata 1 and 2 imply that the PBE is unique. Because the unique PBE of the
continuation game has full separation, each type obtains payoﬀ + c under grade disclosure.
Proceeding as in the previous section, we obtain the following results:
Proposition 3. Suppose grades are suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort.
1. In any PBE, disclosure is chosen if Median
 + c  E [] and non-disclosure is chosen
if Median
 +    c  E []:
2. Suppose G() is increasing. There exists   2 R[f 1;+1g such that, in any PBE,
non-disclosure is chosen if  >   and disclosure is chosen in  <  :
Therefore, the results from the previous section immediately generalize when we allow for
overlapping grades if we assume that grades are suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort. Next, we
consider the case of non-responsive grades.
103.2 Equilibrium with non-responsive grades
When grades are not suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort, there may be multiple equilibria de-
pending on the distribution of types. We will say that a PBE is essentially unique in a
given class of equilibria if all PBE in that class have the same grade and wage schedules, and
feature the same beliefs for all grades on the equilibrium path. The following proposition
states that there exists an essentially unique PBE with non-decreasing eﬀort.15 Moreover,
this equilibrium satisﬁes the intuitive criterion reﬁnement.
Proposition 4. Suppose grades are not suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort. There exists an
essentially unique PBE with non-decreasing eﬀort, in which
e() =

1 if  > 1   
0 if   1    :
Moreover, this PBE survives the intuitive criterion.
Intuitively, when grades are not suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort, a type  student looses
relatively little in the form of wages by choosing low eﬀort and pooling with a lower type
   : Therefore, all types have an incentive to reduce their eﬀort and imitate a slightly less
productive type while saving the cost of eﬀort. Only types at the upper interval (1   ;1]
are able to choose high eﬀort in equilibrium because there are no higher types to pool with
them. When ability is unbounded (1 = +1), this upper interval does not exist and all types
exert low eﬀort despite the fact that it is eﬃcient for all of them to choose high eﬀort.
The formal proof of the proposition will be presented through a series of lemmata. The
ﬁrst lemma establishes that all types that can obtain grades in the highest interval (1;1+]
do so:
Lemma 3. Suppose grades are not suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort. In any PBE with non-
decreasing eﬀort, e() = 1 for all  > 1   .
Proof. Consider a PBE in which a type  > 1    chooses e = 0: Since this equilibrium
is nondecreasing, we cannot have e(   ) = 1: Therefore, type  must be separated and
gets payoﬀ u() = : Suppose this type deviates to e = 1: Because g(;1) =  +  > 1;
consistency of beliefs (Condition 4(c) of Deﬁnition 1) implies that the market would assign
probability one to his true type and would oﬀer wage  + : Thus, the student would get
payoﬀ  +    c >  = u(); contradicting the assumption of this being an equilibrium.
Next, we show that types who are unable to obtain grades in the highest interval choose
low eﬀort:
Lemma 4. Suppose grades are not suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort. In any non-decreasing
PBE, e() = 0 for all   1   .
Proof. Consider a PBE in which e() = 1 for some type  < 1  . Since this equilibrium is
nondecreasing and, by the previous lemma, e(1) = 1, we must also have e() = 1 for all types
in [;1]: In particular, e(1   ) = 1: Since both 1 and 1    choose e = 1; they are both
15A PBE features non-decreasing eﬀort if e() is a non-decreasing function.
11separated in equilibrium and obtain payoﬀs u(1) = 1+ c and u(1 ) = 1 + c:
If type 1 deviates to e = 0; he obtains the same grade as type 1   ; thereby obtaining a
payoﬀ of 1    +  > 1 +    c = u(1): Thus, this is a proﬁtable deviation.
Therefore, the only candidate for a non-decreasing equilibrium eﬀort schedule is the one
in which only types greater than 1    exert high eﬀort. The following lemma establishes
that this schedule can be supported in equilibrium, and that such an equilibrium survives
the intuitive criterion:
Lemma 5. Suppose grades are not suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort. There exists a PBE in
which e() =

1 if  > 1   
0 if   1    . Moreover this PBE survives the intuitive criterion.
Proof. First, we will show that such an equilibrium exists. Given the eﬀort schedule speciﬁed
in the statement of the lemma, it is useful to partition the type space in 3 intervals: [0;1  
2]; (1   2;1   ], and (1   1;1]:
Students choose e() = 0 in the ﬁrst and second intervals and choose e() = 1 in the
third interval. A type  in the ﬁrst interval who deviates to e = 1 obtains the equilibrium
grade of type  +  2 [0 + ;1   ]. A type  in the second interval who deviates to e = 1
obtains grade  +  2 (1   ;1]; which is oﬀ the equilibrium path. Similarly, a type in the
third interval who deviates to e = 0 obtains grades in the interval (1   ;1]; which is oﬀ
the equilibrium path. Let oﬀ-the-equilibrium-path beliefs (jG) assign a unit mass at type
G (i.e., the market assigns probability 1 to the highest of the two possible types when an
oﬀ-equilibrium grade is chosen), and deﬁne wages as the expected product given beliefs. We
will verify that none of these possible deviations are proﬁtable.
If a type  in the ﬁrst or second intervals deviates to e = 1, she is perceived to be type
 + , yielding a payoﬀ of  +    c <  = u(): If a type in the third interval deviates to
e = 0, she is perceived to be type , yielding a payoﬀ of  <  +    c = u(): Thus, there
are no proﬁtable deviations.
Next, we verify that this equilibrium survives the intuitive criterion. Recall that the set
of oﬀ-equilibrium-path grades is (1   ;1]: Consider a grade G in this interval. There are
now two types that can obtain such a grade: G and G   . Grade G is undominated for
types G and G   , respectively, if the following inequalities hold:
u
(G) = G +    c  maxfG + (1   )(G    + )j0    1g; and
u
(G   ) = G     maxfG + (1   )(G    + )j0    1g   c:
Since  > c  ; the maximum term is equal to G    + : Then, these conditions are both
satisﬁed since
c   =) G +    c  G    + ; and
 > c =) G     G    +    c:
Hence, both types are undominated for message G.
12The PBE fails the intuitive criterion if either of the following conditions hold:
minBR(G)u(G;w;G) > u
(G); and
minBR(G)u(G   ;w;G) > u
(G   );
where BR(G) denotes the market’s best response to grade G for some beliefs with support
at the undominated types fG ;Gg. Substituting the student’s equilibrium payoﬀ and the
market’s best response, the ﬁrst condition becomes
G = minfG + (1   )(G    + )j0    1g > G +    c:
Since    c > 0; this inequality is false. The second condition becomes
G   c = minfG + (1   )(G    + )j0    1g   c > G   ;
Because c  ; this is also false. Therefore, the PBE survives the intuitive criterion.
Since an eﬀort schedule pins down beliefs and wages on the equilibrium path, the lemmata
above establish the result from Proposition 4.
Proposition 4 implies that:
Corollary 3. When grades are not suﬃciently responsive to eﬀort, in any PBE with non-
decreasing eﬀort:
1. If Median
 > 1 , disclosure is chosen when Median
 + c  E [] and non-disclosure
is chosen when Median
 +    c  E [];
2. If Median
  1   ; disclosure is chosen when Median
  E [] and non-disclosure is
chosen when Median
  E []:
If the distribution of skills is unbounded (1 = +1), non-disclosure is adopted if the mean-
median gap is positive and disclosure is adopted if it is negative.
The nondecreasing eﬀort restriction is not innocuous. Depending on the distribution of







; there exists a PBE in which e() =

0 if  2 [0 + ;1   ]
1 if  2 [0;0 + ) [ (1   ;1] :
This (non-monotonic) equilibrium also survives the intuitive criterion.16
In the rest of the paper, we will select the non-increasing PBE when considering the model
with suﬃciently unresponsive grades.
16In equilibria with pooling, the condition for grade disclosure to be chosen becomes slightly diﬀerent. For
any  pick one (possibly non-monotone) equilibrium and denote by () the payoﬀ of type  in continuation
game after disclosure is chosen. Let Median
 denote the median payoﬀ. Non-disclosure is chosen if Median
 
E[] and disclosure is chosen if Median
  E[]:
134 Certiﬁcation
Business schools are unique in that most other professional programs – including medicine,
law and accounting – allow for grade disclosure.17 These other programs, however, also have
some uniform certiﬁcation (medical boards, legal bar, CPA) that is required to practice at
the fullest level. We now show how the existence of these external minimum standards makes
it harder to sustain an equilibrium with grade non-disclosure.
Although the results are more general, we consider a simple formulation of certiﬁcation.
There are two types of eﬀort: studying for classes, denoted by e, and studying for the
certiﬁcation exam, denoted by s. For simplicity, we maintain the assumption of binary
eﬀorts, e;s 2 f0;1g, and keep the assumption of an additive production function:
f(;e;s) =  + e + s;
where  2 R captures the eﬀect of studying for the exam on the student’s productivity. When
 = 0; studying for the exam does not aﬀect the student’s productivity.
The cost of eﬀort is represented by the function c(e;s); satisfying the following properties:
Assumption 3. c is strictly increasing and satisﬁes decreasing diﬀerences.
The assumption that c is strictly increasing means that both eﬀorts are costly, while de-
creasing diﬀerences states that studying for classes makes it easier to study for the exam so
that e and s are “cost-complements.” For example, there is usually some overlap between the
material covered in class and the material tested in the certiﬁcation exam, which would make
obtaining the certiﬁcation easier if one studies for class.
In the presence of certiﬁcation, all students are required to exert eﬀort s = 1 in order to
work. In the absence of certiﬁcation, students do not exert such eﬀort (it is not observable
by ﬁrms and, therefore, it is costly but does not raise their wages). The game is exactly
the same as in the model of Sections 2 and 3, with the exception that in the presence of
certiﬁcation workers are required to exert eﬀort s = 1 in order to pass the certiﬁcation exam.
The following proposition states that it is easier to support grade non-disclosure when
there is no certiﬁcation exam. Intuitively, when studying for classes and for the certiﬁcation
exam are cost complements, certiﬁcation reduces the incremental cost of studying for classes,
thereby increasing the value of disclosure.
Proposition 5. Consider the model of either Section 2 or Section 3 and suppose Assumption
3 holds. If there exists an equilibrium with grade disclosure under non-certiﬁcation, there also
exists an equilibrium with grade disclosure under certiﬁcation.
Proof. Under Assumption 3, the relevant conditions for grade non-disclosure under certiﬁca-
tion and non-certiﬁcation are

Median
   E[]  c(1;1)   c(0;1); and (4)

Median
   E[]  c(1;0)   c(0;0): (5)
17Limited exceptions were noted earlier.
14Suppose inequality (4) is satisﬁed. Then,
Median
   E[]  c(1;1)   c(0;1)
 c(1;0)   c(0;0);
where the second inequality follows from the decreasing diﬀerences property of c: Hence, (5)
is also satisﬁed.
5 Minimum Grade Requirements and Awards
In the presence of grade non-disclosure, schools still have some limited tools available to
encourage eﬀort. The two most common instruments are awards and honors as well as some
minimum performance requirement. Based on our conversations with MBA oﬃces at most
of these schools, awards tend to be more emphasized at schools with a non-disclosure policy,
often as an explicit attempt to challenge grade non-disclosure. “Implicit” distinctions also
exist in other forms, including winning a teaching assistant position. Concurrently, some
MBA programs also impose certain minimum requirements that require some non-trivial
amount of eﬀort. For example, students at Wharton are dismissed if they score in the
bottom decile in at least ﬁve credit unit courses during their ﬁrst year or eight credit unit
courses over two years, a rule passed during the 1998 school year by faculty in response to
grade non-disclosure. We will address the minimum requirements ﬁrst.
5.1 Minimum Grades
Imposing a minimum grade has two eﬀects. On the one hand, it may prevent individuals
with the lowest skills from being able to graduate. On the other hand, it induces those with
intermediate skills to exert high eﬀort. Formally, let  g denote the minimum grade. A type-
student is able to obtain the degree under eﬀort e if g(;e)   g:
We assume that the market cannot determine if a student attended a school but was
unable to obtain the minimum grade or if the student never attended the school, and denote
the expected productivity of someone who did not attend school by  w < E[]   c for all :
Assume that exerting high eﬀort is eﬃcient  > c (otherwise there would be no gains from
incentivizing eﬀort).
In the case of grade non-disclosure, students who are able to meet the minimum grade
requirement exert the minimum eﬀort needed to do so:
eND () =

0 if g(;0)   g or g(;1) <  g
1 if g(;0) <  g  g(;1) :
Model with non-overlapping grades. In in the model with non-overlapping grades (Sec-
tion 2), it is possible to induce all students to exert high eﬀort by setting the minimum grade
 g 2 (g(1;0);g(0;1)], that is, at level above the grade that would be obtained by a highest
ability student under low eﬀort. When the equilibrium of the model without minimum grades
features disclosure (i.e., Median
 +    c  E[]), the minimum grade is innocuous since all
students would already choose a high eﬀort.
15When the equilibrium features non-disclosure (E[]  Median
 +    c), the minimum
grade policy shifts the equilibrium eﬀort of all students from low to high, which increases
their payoﬀs by    c > 0. Moreover, they still vote for non-disclosure since
E [] +    c > E[]  
Median
 +    c:
Hence, any equilibrium with a minimum grade  g 2 (g(1;0);g(0;1)] is preferred by all stu-
dents relative to the equilibrium without minimum grade. The minimum grade requirement
eliminates "free riding" oﬀ of the reduced signal under non-disclosure, leading to a Pareto
improvement (it increases all students’ payoﬀs while leaving ﬁrms with the same proﬁt as
before).
Model with overlapping grades. In the model of Section 3, it is impossible to simultane-
ously ensure that all types choose high eﬀort and all types achieve the minimum grade under
non-disclosure. If the minimum grade is set below g(1;0), some types will choose low eﬀort.
If it is set above g(0;1), some types will be unable to achieve the minimum grade. Since
g(1;0) < g(0;1); no minimum grade is able to simultaneously avoid both issues. Neverthe-
less, a minimum grade that is high enough to require eﬀort from the lowest types but low
enough to make sure that all students are able to pass increases ex-ante welfare.18 Therefore,
any mechanism that determines the minimum grade policy by an eﬃciency criterion would
select an interior minimum grade. Such a mechanism may be the outcome of the school
maximizing student welfare, proﬁts, or a combination of both. Moreover, there exists an
interior minimum grade that is preferred by the majority of students and would, therefore,
be selected by a majority rule voting procedure.
Proposition 6. Consider the model of either Section 2 or 3. Suppose it is eﬃcient to
exert high eﬀort  > c and all equilibria have grade non-disclosure Median
 +    c < E[].







strictly increases the ex-ante
welfare E[u()], and is strictly preferred by the majority of students (relative to a policy of
no minimum grades).
Proof. Consider either the model of Section 2 or Section 3. Since  is an atomless distribution,
Median







. Under no minimum grades, all PBE
have grade non-disclosure and low eﬀort. Under the minimum grade policy, the median type
still chooses low eﬀort in case of non-disclosure but all types  such that g(;0) <  g exert
high eﬀort in order to achieve the minimum grade. Let  2 (0;Median
 ) be the ﬁrst type
who is able to pass with low eﬀort: g(;0) =  g: Payoﬀs in any PBE without minimum grade
are E[] whereas payoﬀs in any PBE with the minimum grade  g are
E[] + ()   c if <

E[] + () if   
 :
Since  < Median
 , it follows that the median type is better oﬀ under minimum grade:
E[] + () > E[]: Taking the expectation of payoﬀs with respect to , yields
E[] + (
)(   c) > E[];
which establishes that ex-ante welfare is higher under the minimum grade policy.
18Ex-ante welfare is the expected utility computed at time “t = 0,” before students know their ability . It
is also the utilitarian welfare criterion.







increases the payoﬀ of the median student
in the presence of grade non-disclosure by inducing eﬀort from types with lower ability,
thereby increasing the mean wage. It does not, however, aﬀect payoﬀs in the presence of a
grade disclosure policy. Therefore, a minimum grade requirement increases the support for
grade non-disclosure. Paradoxically, the same minimum grade policies that have been enacted
as a reaction to grade non-disclosure may be helping grade non-disclosure to perpetuate.
5.2 Awards and Prizes
Although schools are not allowed to disclose grades to potential employers, they are allowed
to distribute awards and honors to students with “exceptional performance.” Moreover,
because the law treats awards and honors as directory information, schools may disclose this
information publicly.
Consider an award or honor given to a fraction of students with the highest grades.
Formally, the award is modeled as a binary signal distinguishing the students with grades in
the top  percentile of the grade distribution from other students. Since this signal does not
reveal any additional information when grades are disclosed, it does not aﬀect the equilibrium
of the continuation game after a grade disclosure policy has been selected. However, in the
case of grade non-disclosure, allowing students with the highest grades to separate themselves
reduces the mean wage of the students who have not received such a distinction.
More formally, consider the continuation game after non-disclosure has been selected (the
continuation game after disclosure is selected is trivial). There are no pure strategy equilibria.
To see why, let 
 denote the lowest type in the the top  percentile of the type distribution
and let 
 > 








d () = :
If a positive mass of types  2 (
;
 ) chooses low eﬀort, types slightly below 
 prefer to
exert high eﬀort and get the prize. However, if types slightly below 
 choose high eﬀort,
all types in (
;
 ) prefer to choose high eﬀort as well and guarantee that they will get the
prize. But if all types in (
;
 ) choose high eﬀort, those below 
 have no chance of getting
the prize and, therefore, choose low eﬀort. Yet, if all types below 
 choose low eﬀort, all
types above 
 can win the prize even with low eﬀort and, therefore, choose low eﬀort. Thus,
we cannot have an equilibrium in pure strategies.
There exist, however, equilibria in mixed strategies. We characterize these equilibria in
the Appendix but discuss their intuition here. Any mixed strategy equilibrium partitions the
type space in three intervals. In the ﬁrst interval, [0;) all types choose low eﬀort and never
win the prize. In the second interval, [;  ]; almost all types play strictly mixed strategies.
They get the prize when they play e = 1 and they do not get the prize when they play e = 0:
In the third interval, (  ;1], all types choose the low eﬀort but still get the prize.
Since a positive mass of students exerts high eﬀort, the ex-ante welfare in all of these
equilibria is strictly greater than in the equilibria of the model with no awards when eﬀort
is eﬃcient.
Proposition 7. Consider the model of either Section 2 or 3. Suppose it is eﬃcient to exert
17high eﬀort  > c and all equilibria have grade non-disclosure med
 + c < E[]. Introducing
an award strictly increases the ex-ante welfare.
Proof. Existence of a mixed strategy equilibrium for the continuation game follows from
standard arguments. Since the game does not have an equilibrium in which almost all types
exert low eﬀort, there must be a positive mass of types who exert high eﬀort. Let  > 0
denote the mass of such types. The ex-ante payoﬀ is then E[] + (   c) which is greater
than the ex-ante payoﬀ without the award E[].
Whenever the prize is given to less than half of students, the majority will oppose it.
Because the median voter will not be able to obtain the prize without exerting high eﬀort,
he must be at most indiﬀerent between exerting high and low eﬀorts. However, when the
median voter exerts low eﬀort, he does not win the prize and obtains a strictly lower wage
than the wage he would obtain in the absence of this policy. Thus, a prize makes the median
voter worse oﬀ.
More generally, the exclusion of the top of the distribution lowers the payoﬀ under non-
disclosure for all but the extreme types who can guarantee themselves to be in the top of
the distribution (  ;1]. Therefore, except when the distribution is suﬃciently concentrated
at the top and the award is given to a large proportion of students, an award policy reduces
support for grade non-disclosure.
6 Conclusion
Grade non-disclosure is prevalent among elite MBA programs but not commonly found in
lower ranked MBA programs as well as other professional degree programs with external
certiﬁcation. Students suggest that grade non-disclosure policies allow them to take more
diﬃcult classes. For example, the former president of the student association at Chicago
Booth School of Business, April Park, argues that “grade non-disclosure allows students to
take more challenging courses instead of taking classes in which they are over-qualiﬁed.”19
However, self-reported levels of curriculum eﬀort have actually fallen since grade non-
disclosure policies were adopted. According to the chairman of Harvard’s MBA program
Richard Ruback, “numerous students had claimed that the non-disclosure policy resulted in
little motivation to excel.”20 Akram Zaman, former co-president of the Harvard’s Student
Association’s Executive Committee, claims that “there is a perception that general academic
motivation and rigor has gone down [since the adoption of grade non-disclosure]. (...) People
think that they won’t be in the top fraction of the class and that they won’t fail out, so many
of them take on the attitude that they don’t need to work as hard.”21 As a Stanford GSB
student puts it, “[t]he grade non-disclosure policy is somewhat of a curse because it inspires
a noticeable amount of apathy among the students. Class participation is good enough, but
not as great as it could be if students were a little more compelled to prepare.”22
19The Economist, ibid.
20The Economist, ibid.
21Harvard Crimson. “HBS Rethinks Grade Policy,” November, 2005.
22Wise and Hauser (2007).
18At Wharton, the amount of time spent on academics fell by 22% in the ﬁrst four years
after grade non-disclosure was implemented.23 Moreover, the pattern of courses waved by
students was not aﬀected by the introduction of grade nondisclosure.24 Therefore, the idea
that grade non-disclosure allows students to take more challenging courses cannot account
for the trend in average studying eﬀort among MBA students. It is also not clear why the
beneﬁt from taking more diﬃcult classes would be restricted to elite MBA programs, which
is needed to explain the cross-sectional pattern of grade non-disclosure policies.
The Student Handbook of Stanford GSB mentions that grade non-disclosure improves
student cooperation. This hypothesis is also problematic. As Kreps (2005) argues, “[h]elping
one or two or ten classmates here probably does not materially aﬀect your chances of landing
a desirable job (...). There are 370 or so of you. How likely is it that you will compete for
a given job with one of the people in your circle?” Even if there are gains from cooperation,
the time-series evidence suggests that they are coming at the expense of reduced studying
eﬀort. Moreover, it is again unclear why the importance of cooperation is restricted to elite
MBA programs and not other MBA or other professional degree programs.
Our model explains why students in elite programs might pass non-disclosure norms
that reduce both their signal and their level of eﬀort if they dislike studying. Our model also
explains why non-disclosure appears to be fairly unique to elite MBA programs. Interestingly,
minimum grade requirements, which were implemented as a way of combating non-disclosure,
actually increases its support in equilibrium, precisely by enhancing the wage of colluding
students. In contrast, awards reduce the support for non-disclosure by reducing the wage of
colluding students who are not able to earn the distinction. External certiﬁcation reduces
the support for non-disclosure by reducing the incremental cost of studying.
Our results, therefore, identify two mechanisms – certiﬁcation exams and awards – that
can reduce support for non-disclosure in equilibrium. Most schools with non-disclosure norms
currently utilize some form of prizes or honors. But MBA students are not subject to certi-
ﬁcation requirements in a way that would change the level of eﬀort of the median student,
which is likely substantially more powerful. Certiﬁcation (or a minimum grade threshold
that is more stringent than current practice) is both legal and is not generally practiced, as
in other professional occupations. Future work could explore this issue in more detail.
Appendix
Equilibrium of Game with Awards
This section characterizes the mixed strategy PBE of the game with prizes under grade non-
disclosure discussed in Subsection 5.2. For simplicity, will assume that the grade technology is
additive as in Section 3: g(;e) = +e: We will omit  from the distributions for notational
clarity.
23Business Week, “Campus Conﬁdential.” (Sep 12, 2005). As a Wharton student argues, “Wharton students
don’t always see their studies as their top priority, but instead look to balance their time between academics,
career search, and social fun. This is made possible by the school’s grade nondisclosure policy, which prevents
students from sharing their grades with recruiters.” Wise and Hauser, ibid.
24Jain (1997).
19Let a() 2 [0;1] denote the probability of a type  student choosing e = 1: We assume that
there is a continuum of students of each type. By the monotonicity of the grade technology,
any equilibrium is characterized by two thresholds,  and   such that a() = 0 if  <  or
 >  ; and a() 2 (0;1) for almost all types  <  <  .25 Assume that the distribution of
types  has a continuous probability distribution function, denoted by 0() =
@()
@ . Given
the thresholds  and  , we can compute the probability distribution of grades:
 (G) =
8
> > > > <
> > > > :
0(G) if G    + 
0(G) + 0(G   )a(G   ) if    G <     
0(G)[1   a(G)] + 0(G   )a(G   )a(G   ) if  +   G <  
[1   a(G)]0 (G) if   G <  + 
0(G) if G < 
:
Integrating, we obtain the cumulative distribution of grades (G): Types in the interval [;  ]
must be indiﬀerent between high and low eﬀorts in order to play mixed strategies.
Let G denote the minimum grade required to get the prize:  = 1 (G): If G > +,
types in (;G   ) never win the prize and, therefore, cannot be indiﬀerent between high
and low eﬀort. On the other hand, if G <     types in the interval (G + ;) win the
prize even with low eﬀort, and therefore cannot be indiﬀerent between high and low eﬀorts.
Therefore, we must have G =  + ; i.e. all types that play mixed strategies win the prize
if they choose e = 1 and do not win if they choose e = 0: Substituting in the cumulative










Therefore, the minimum grade G and the mixed strategies a(G) must satisfy:





Let wP and wNP denote the wages oﬀered for those who win and do not win the prize:













G  a()( + )d()

:
Types in the interval [;  ] must be indiﬀerent between high and low eﬀorts: wP   c = wNP:













25As we will show, all types in this intermediate interval are indiﬀerent between both actions. Therefore,
a measure zero of types may play pure strategies, which does not aﬀect the probability of getting a prize.









d() + (1   )
 G
G 
a()d() = (1   )c: (7)
Any real number G 2 (0 + ;1) and function a() : (G   ;G) ! (0;1) satisfying
conditions (6) and (7) is a PBE of the game.
Consider the case of types distributed according to a uniform [0;1] distribution and sup-
pose all types that play mixed strategies play the same strategy: a() =  a 2 (0;1) for all
 2 (G;G + ). In this case, after tedious algebraic manipulations, it can be shown that




















 c ; the unique solution is the positive root of this equation. For example, when
 = 2; c = 1;  = 1
10; and  = 1
4; we obtain G = 3
p
16297 93
360  0:8055 and  a = 18
5   4G 
0:3780: In the unique mixed strategy equilibrium in which all players in the intermediate





0 if     0:5555
0:3780 if 0:5555      G  0:8055
0 if  > G  0:8055
:
This is the unique PBE in which all types that play mixed strategies play the same strategy
 a: However, this equilibrium is not unique. For example, any function a() taking values





















where G = 3
p
16297 93
360 and  a = 18
5   4G is also a PBE of the model.
General Production Functions
This section considers the model of Section 2 under nonlinear production functions f(;e):
Because students are risk neutral, one can also think of the productivity of type  given
eﬀort e as a random variable with expected value equal to f(;e). We assume that f is
non-decreasing in both arguments.
Equilibrium
Proceeding as in Section 2, the payoﬀ of type  under grade disclosure is
() = maxff(;1)   c;f(;0)g;
whereas the payoﬀ under grade non-disclosure is E [f (;0)]: Since  is strictly monotonic,
the median of () is equal to (Median
 ): Hence, we have the following result:
21Proposition 8. In any PBE, disclosure is chosen if (Median
 )  E [f (;0)] and non-
disclosure is chosen if (Median
 )  E [f (;0)].
In particular, when wages under low eﬀort f(;0) are symmetrically distributed for every
; there always exists a PBE in which disclosure wins. For distributions such that median
wage is below the average wage, non-disclosure is chosen if the median type’s incremental
productivity from eﬀort is not too large:
Corollary 4. Suppose f(Median
 ;0) < E[f (;0)]: There exists  > c such that non-
disclosure is chosen in any PBE if f(Median
 ;1)   f(Median
 ;0)  .
Proof. If f(Median
 ;1)   f(Median
 ;0) = c; the result is immediate. Suppose f(Median
 ;1)  
f(Median
 ;0) > c and deﬁne "  f(Median
 ;1)   f(Median















 ;1)   f(
Median























As in the model with additive production functions, if the mean output under non-
disclosure is more responsive to a change in selectivity than the median output given dis-
closure, increasing selectivity would raise the proportion of people voting for non-disclosure.





denote the gap between the mean payoﬀ under low
eﬀort and the median payoﬀ under the optimal eﬀort. Then, we have:
Corollary 5. Suppose ~ G() is increasing. There exists   2 R[f 1;+1g such that, in
any PBE, non-disclosure is chosen if  >   and disclosure is chosen in  <  :
Let   supff (;1)   f (;0)g: The following proposition shows that, when the produc-
tivity given low eﬀort follows a lognormal distribution, non-disclosure is chosen if the school’s
selectivity is suﬃciently high.
Proposition 9. Let f(;0) lognormal(;2). For any ; there exists  () such that non-
disclosure is chosen for all  >  (): Moreover,  () is a non-decreasing function.













expression for the mean of the lognormal distribution, we obtain






































+ maxf   c;0g:
Thus,








  maxf   c;0g = e
+ 2
2   e
   maxf   c;0g;
22where the equality uses the expression for the median of a lognormal distribution. Since
non-disclosure is chosen whenever ~ G()  0; a suﬃcient condition for grade non-disclosure




  maxf   c;0g:
This expression is always true when   c: For  > c; it is satisﬁed if







which completes the proof.
The generalization of our results on minimum grades and awards is straightforward. On
the next subsection, we consider the generalization of our results on the eﬀects of certiﬁcation
on non-disclosure.
Certiﬁcation
There are two types of eﬀort: studying for classes e 2 f0;1g, and studying for the
certiﬁcation exam, s 2 f0;1g. For simplicity, we assume that the productivity of a student
is additively separable between eﬀorts:
f(;e;s) = g(;e) + h(;s):
The cost of eﬀort is represented by the strictly increasing function c(e;s); satisfying de-
creasing diﬀerences. In the presence of certiﬁcation, all students are required to exert eﬀort
s = 1. We maintain the assumption that the distribution of productivities in the case of zero
eﬀort for class is skewed to the right so that the median is lower than the mean:
Assumption 4. f(Median
 ;0;s)  E[f(;0;s)] for s 2 f0;1g:
We also assume that studying for the certiﬁcation exam does not increase the mean (expected)
productivity by more than it increases the median productivity:
Assumption 5. E[h(;1)   h(;0)]  h(Median
 ;1)   h(Median
 ;0):
Assumption 5 is satisﬁed, for example, if certiﬁcation changes productivity uniformly (i.e.,
h is constant in ), or has no eﬀect on productivity. It is also satisﬁed if certiﬁcation helps
lower types more than higher types (i.e., h has decreasing diﬀerences) and the distribution
of the beneﬁt of studying for certiﬁcation is skewed to the right. For example, suppose h is
linear:
h(;s) = (1   )s + ;
where   0 in order to satisfy decreasing diﬀerences and  2 R. Assumption 5 is satisﬁed
if and only if Median
  E[]:
It is reasonable to assume that a certiﬁcation technology that ensures that all students
have a minimum set of basic skills increases the productivity of unskilled students more
than the productivity of skilled students (decreasing diﬀerences). Assumption 5 will then be
satisﬁed as long as the distribution of abilities is skewed to the right, consistent with previous
examples.
23The following proposition states that it is easier to support grade nondisclosure when
there is no certiﬁcation exam. Intuitively, certiﬁcation raises the median productivity more
than the expected productivity, giving the median voter more incentive to want to reveal his
own ability even at the cost of more eﬀort.
Proposition 10. If there exists an equilibrium with grade disclosure under non-certiﬁcation,
there also exists an equilibrium with grade disclosure under certiﬁcation.
Proof. Under Assumption 4, the relevant conditions for grade non-disclosure under certiﬁca-
tion and non-certiﬁcation are
f(
Median
 ;1;1)   E[f(;0;1)]  c(1;1)   c(0;1); and (8)
f(
Median
 ;1;0)   E[f(;0;0)]  c(1;0)   c(0;0): (9)
Using additive separability, we obtain
f(
Median
 ;1;1)   E[f(;0;1)] = h(
Median
 ;1)   E[h(;1)]; and
f(
Median
 ;1;0)   E[f(;0;0)] = h(
Median
 ;0)   E[h(;0)]:
Suppose inequality (8) is satisﬁed. Then,
h(
Median
 ;0)   E[h(;0)]  h(
Median
 ;1)   E[h(;1)]
 c(1;1)   c(0;1)
 c(1;0)   c(0;0);
where the ﬁrst inequality follows by Assumption 5, the second is due to (8) , and the third
follows from the decreasing diﬀerences property of c: Hence, (9) is also satisﬁed.
Continuum of Eﬀorts
In this section, we consider the model with a continuum of eﬀort levels: e 2 [e0;e1]: Each
type  who exerts eﬀort e obtains grade g(;e). We assume that the grade function is twice
diﬀerentiable and strictly increasing so that both ability and eﬀort increase grades. Moreover,





, which states that eﬀort has a
higher impact on grades for students with greater ability.
As before, the student’s utility function is U(w;e) = w c(e); where c is strictly increasing.
Because grades are strictly increasing in ability, there exists an inverse function g 1(;) such
that for all ,
e = g
 1 (;g (;e)):
Letting C(;g) = c(g 1(;g)); we can write the utility function of type  as
V (w;g;) = w   C(;g);
where @C
@ < 0; @C
@e > 0; and @2C
@@e < 0:
Treating grades as the student’s choice variable, the continuation game after grade disclo-
sure has been selected becomes the standard model of Spence (1974) and Riley (1975). Under
24certain selection criteria, including the reactive equilibrium of Riley (1979), the divinity and
universal divinity criteria of Bank and Sobel (1987), the D1 criterion of Cho and Kreps
(1987), and the stability criterion of Kohlberg and Mertens (1987), the unique equilibrium is
the most eﬃcient separating PBE (Riley outcome).
Therefore, under any of those selection criteria, the unique equilibrium of the continu-
ation game under grade disclosure features full separation. The continuation game under
nondisclosure still features e = e0; and w = E[f(;0)]: Hence, the results from this paper
generalize to the model with a continuum of eﬀorts with the appropriate substitution of the
payoﬀs from the continuation games under disclosure and non-disclosure.26
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